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Abstract 
Given the failure of top-down initiatives to bring about community development (CD) in 
many developing countries, attention is  switching  to bottom-up approaches, one of which is 
to use community-based organizations (CBOs) as the conduit through which CD may be 
achieved. This paper compares the effectiveness of traditional CBOs (TCBOs) and modern 
CBOs (MCBOs) in fostering CD in eight communities in Ogoniland, Nigeria, where there is 
a long history of neglect and underdevelopment. The paper was based on extensive fieldwork 
carried out in eight Ogoni communities during 2013-2014, which involved 101 telephone 
interviews with residents (TIs), 67 face-to-face key informant interviews (KIs), 189 survey 
questionnaires (SQs), and three focus groups discussions (FGDs). The two main conclusions 
reached by this paper are that despite some praise expressed by respondents for their CBOs, 
the fashionable belief that CBOs are strong agents of bottom-up CD is not borne out by this 
study; and there is little difference between respondents’ evaluations of the contributions to 
CD made by MCBOs and the much-vaunted TCBOs.  
Introduction 
Community-based organizations (CBOs) have frequently been characterized as a means of 
promoting community development (CD) in Africa (Opare, 2007; Onyeozu, 2010; Abegunde, 
2009, Dinbaba, 2014; Kelsall, 2011). Often, these CBOs have been seen as making up for the 
failure of top-down attempts to achieve CD. For instance, Abegunde (2009, p. 1) claims that 
the “poor performance of government in meeting the socioeconomic quests of citizens has 
been identified as one of the reasons behind the proliferation of community based 
organizations”. In their analysis of 114 CBOs in Delta state, south-south Nigeria, Ugboh and 
Tibi (2008) claim that CBOs are valuable agents for CD because they obtain funds through 
levies and donations to support agriculture, manage agricultural and rural development 
schemes, promote harmony among local people, assist communities assess proposals on how 
to achieve CD, serve as middlemen between government and communities, and arouse the 
political consciousness of community members. Narayan et al (2000) commend CBOs as the 
21st century agents of bottom-up CD because they entail community members initiating and 
driving their own development. According to Yachkaschi (2008), Opare (2007) and Onyeozu 
(2010), CBOs as grass-root organizations take advantage of their deep-rootedness in the 
community to evaluate community needs in order to meet them. Dill (2010, p. 1) claims that 
there is a belief that CBO programmes are designed to “work with the grain” of their 
traditions.  
It is the aim of the current study to test these endorsements of the value of CBOs, by 
investigating perceptions of their role held by residents in eight Ogoni communities in Rivers 
state in southern Nigeria. Before explaining the study, however, there are three preliminary 
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issues to be clarified. First, the term CBO must be defined. Blaikie (2006, p.1953) says that 
the concept is “porous, can absorb all manner of different” organizations. Some 
commentators such as Magadla (2008) argue that CBOs can be defined as organizations that 
serve the whole community. Other commentators include sectional groups in their definitions 
of CBOs. For example, Ajayi and Otuya (2005) distinguish between traditional indigenous 
CBOs (TCBOs) and sectional organizations in communities in Delta state, on grounds that 
traditional CBOs serve the whole community, whereas sectional organizations serve as 
sources of income only for their members, yet both groups are CBOs. The current study 
adopts the latter, inclusive approach of regarding both publicly-oriented and sectional groups 
as CBOs, differentiating them as traditional (TCBOs) and modern (MCBOs) respectively, 
noting that TCBOs originate from within communities, whereas MCBOs originate from 
without. TCBOs include formal governance organisations such as the Councils of Chiefs and 
Elders (CCE) and the Community Development Committees (CDC), together with youth and 
gender-based groups, dance, football, and cultural groups. MCBOs include environmental 
and charity groups, and town and residents’ groups.   
 
More attention in the literature is focused on the role of TCBOs than MCBOs. For example, 
Kelsall (2008, p.1) claims that sustainable CD should go with the grain of the African 
tradition of indigenous CBOs, which are groups that are expert “in solving collective action 
problems and providing public goods…harness[ing] the motivating forces of family, ethnicity 
or religion”. Kendie and Guri (nd) praise the contributions of indigenous CBOs such as the 
nnoboa (community self-help groups); the asafo (community security groups); the susu 
(community savings and loans groups); the clan organizations; and the hunters’ groups, to  
CD in communities in northern Ghana. However, researchers are also beginning to study 
non-traditional or modern CBOs (MCBOs). For example, Adebayo (2012) reports the 
presence of three kinds of MCBOs in riverine communities of Ilaje, south-western Nigeria: 
small-scale business assistance organizations, cooperative groups, and technical professional 
associations. Onyeozu (2010) in his study of CBOs in Rivers state, suggests that modern 
social clubs work alongside TCBOs.  
 
The second preliminary issue to be clarified is the meaning of the term ‘community 
development’ (CD). Bhattacharyya (2004) quotes Denise and Harris who report that CD “is 
as varied in definition as those who profess to practice it”. Since the early 1990s, most 
attention on CD in Ogoniland was focused on modernising the physical infrastructure of 
communities (Oguine, 2000; Omotola, 2007; Akinwale and Osabuohien, 2009). 
Subsequently, Shell embraced ‘softer’ goals such as human capital (e.g. education and skill 
development), and introduced microcredit schemes to boost the economic capital of local 
communities (Tuodolo, 2009; Burger, 2011). This later model of CD was less prescriptive, 
providing opportunities rather than buildings (Ekanem et al., 2014). However, Cavaye 
(2001), Page and Czuba (1999), and Campbell and Jovchelovitch (2007) have argued that CD 
as a process should foster power in community members to drive their own development and 
lead their own lives. For example, Page and Czuba (1999, p.2) refers to CD not as an end but 
as a “process that fosters power in people for use in their own lives, their communities”.  
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The third preliminary issue to be clarified is the context in which the eight Ogoni 
communities exist. Without knowing the circumstances of Ogoni life, it will be hard to 
understand Ogoni perceptions of CBO and CD. The Ogoni indigenous people number about 
832,000, according to the 2006 census (UNEP, 2011) and live in an area of about 1000 
square kilometres in the south eastern part of Rivers state (Boele et al, 2001). With the 
discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities in K-Dere, Ebubu, Bodo West and Korokoro 
communities of Ogoniland in the mid-1950s and the subsequent expansion of oil exploration 
sites and facilities, Ogoni communities began to suffer severely from the effects of pollution 
which came from every stage of exploration (Fentiman and Zabbey, 2015). Even though 
Shell Petroleum Development Company, the only multinational oil company with a mining 
licence to operate in Ogoniland, moved out of Ogoni in 1993, Ogonis still experience harmful 
effects of oil pollution, not only because Shell oil pipelines continue to pass through their 
communities, but also because past incidents of oil pollutions have not been properly 
remediated (UNEP, 2011). The Nigerian government, which licensed out Ogoniland to Shell, 
has consistently prioritized national economic growth over remediation of localized oil 
pollution (ACHPR, 2002). Pollution and poor remediation allows oil to seep through into 
underground aquifers, and according to UNEP (2011), this has resulted in the pollution not 
only of the soil but also of the underground water, resulting in most sources of water in Ogoni 
being about 1,000 times more polluted than the Nigerian minimum safety standard. This 
devastation has not only affected the economic prospects, but also the cultural life, of Ogonis 
(Pegg and Zabbey, 2013; Fentiman and Zabbey, 2015), yet the Nigerian government seems 
“more receptive to the needs of oil companies rather than village communities” (Frynas, 
2000, p. 41). Moreover, Human Rights Watch (2007, p.1) reported that some Ogoni 
communities lack basic education and health facilities. The majority of Ogoni people live on 
less than $1 per day – an extent of poverty described by Ikejiaku (2009, p.15) as “poverty qua 
poverty”, a condition in which the vast majority find it difficult to feed and clothe 
themselves, have rooves over their heads, and acquire education beyond primary school level 
(see also Ekpenyong et al, 2010).  
 
Despite these life-threatening health hazards, which UNEP (2011) link to Ogonis’ average 
life expectancy of less than 50 years, Ogonis’ complaints have not been met by either the 
Nigerian government or Shell (Pegg and Zabbey, 2013). It is true that the Nigerian 
government has attempted several initiatives to improve the conditions of Ogoni communities 
(Aghalino, 2002; Frynas, 2005; Rexler, 2010; Ugoh and Ukpere, 2010; Ering, 2013), yet 
most of the wealth generated from Ogoniland is not used to develop Ogoni communities but 
to benefit communities of major ethnic groups across Nigeria (Akpomuvie, 2011; Nbete 
2012; Tyoyila and Terhenmen, 2012). It is also true that Shell has invested in building 
infrastructures, awarded overseas scholarships, and funded training in employment skills. 
Indeed, Burger (2011, p.7) quoted the Managing Director of Shell who claimed that “in a 
region and country where publicly provided infrastructures and services are badly lacking, 
SPDC has often stepped in and acted in lieu of government”. However, critics have argued 
that due to poor engagement with local communities, the top-down, ‘expert’- based 
prescriptive models of CD practised by the state and the private sector do not reflect 
community-felt needs (Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2010; Aghalino, (nd); Idumange, 2011). 
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For all these reasons, Ogonis are development-poor and have over many years relied on self-
help through their many and varied CBOs (Onyeozu, 2010; Ugboh and Tibi, 2007; Ajayi and 
Otuya, 2005). The current study seeks to investigate the performance of the innumerable 
CBOs in Ogoniland. 
 
Methods 
This study makes use primarily of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, relying 
heavily on telephone interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and open-
ended questionnaires. Preparation for the first phase of fieldwork on this topic started in May 
2013, beginning with a pilot study which entailed the collection of names, phone contacts and 
addresses of CBOs in Ogoniland. Information about 67 TCBOs was obtained from survey 
questionnaires (SQs), key informants (KIs) and focus groups discussions (FGDs). From this 
information, a list of 54 active TCBOs was drawn up. Information about registered MCBOs 
was obtained from Eleme, Gokana, Khana, and Tai local government council offices, and the 
Ministry of Youth Development, Port Harcourt, Rivers state, and a list of 405 MCBOs was 
compiled. However, many of the contact telephone numbers contained in the list of 405 
MCBOs were unobtainable, and the researchers succeeded in contacting 101 MCBOs, which 
they engaged in telephone interviewing. In all, 155 CBOs were investigated out of a total of 
472 identified. 
The second phase of fieldwork took place between February and May, 2014, carried out in 
eight communities across the above four local government areas of Ogoniland to investigate 
the way residents of Ogoniland perceive the meaning of the concepts of CBO and CD, and 
the roles of TCBOs and MCBOs as agents of bottom-up CD. In this phase, 189 SQs were 
completed by current and past leaders of TCBOs within the communities of study. 
Participants were recruited through snowball sampling, and questionnaires were carried out 
either by the researcher or an assistant. In addition, 67 key informants (KIs) were interviewed 
by the researcher (also recruited through snowball sampling) who were mostly members of 
TCBOs and beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries of MCBOs. Three FGDs were also conducted in 
three of the eight communities studied; most discussants were selected based on their in-
depth knowledge of the subject of study.  
The choice of Ebubu, Ogali, Lewe, K-Dere, Sii 2, Kaani, Korokoro and Nonwa communities 
situated in Eleme, Gokana, Khana and Tai local government areas, was based on their spread 
across all Ogoni local government areas (LGAs), and also on whether they are oil-rich or oil-
poor. There are five oil-rich communities (Ebubu, Ogali, K-Dere, Korokoro, and Nonwa) and 
three oil-poor communities (Lewe, Sii 2, and Kaani). Although Shell no longer produces oil 
from Ogoniland, the five oil-rich communities still suffer serious pollution from Shell’s 
facilities and spill locations (UNEP, 2011). While it is true that oil pollution knows no 
boundaries, oil-rich communities gain more attention and cash than do oil-poor communities 
in terms of compensation from Shell (Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002; Arisuokwu, 2012; 
Mohammed, 2013). The current study is interested in finding out whether there is any 
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difference between perceptions about TCBOs and MCBOs held by people living in oil-rich 
communities compared to people living in oil-poor communities.  
The qualitative data gathered from the TIs, KIs, FGDs and SGs were transcribed and 
analysed thematically. Patterns between these sets of data were traced, and frequencies of 
themes were counted and worked out in percentages using Microsoft Excel. 
 
Traditional and modern CBOs in Ogoniland 
 
In this section, we report the perceptions of interview respondents on (1) the two types of 
CBOs in their communities (TCBOs and MCBOs); (2) the criteria of community 
development (CD); and (3) the respective performances of their TCBOs and MCBOs in 
meeting those criteria of CD.  
 
TCBOs and MCBOs in Ogoniland 
 
Traditional community-based organizations (TCBOs) 
 
The total number of TCBOs studied was 54, divided into two tiers: the first tier (FTCBOs) 
comprises eight Councils of Chiefs and Elders (CCE), eight Community Development 
Committees (CDC), eight youth organizations (YO), and eight men’s and 14 women’s 
organizations (MWO). CCEs are made up of elderly men, usually the oldest members of 
families, generally perceived as living custodians of community culture, and they play a 
largely advisory role. According to key informant interviewee KI -18, “they advise us and the 
first thing we do is to listen to our elders, we obey them because they were here before us and 
so they know better than us”. KI-27 reports that membership of FTCBOs is “right from 
birth”, since TCBOs are kinship organizations, culturally structured to accommodate every 
adult in the community. Membership of FTCBOs is compulsory, because “as a community 
member, you must, I use the word you must, identify with an organization, as a woman, you 
belong to the women group, a man, the men organization”. KI-3 claims that FTCBOs “cover 
every son and daughter of our community”. Twenty-six respondents state that FTCBOs 
finance CD from community contributions like levies and dues. Survey questionnaire 
respondent SQ-132 reports that his community gets funds for CD “through collective 
contribution from villagers”. However, another source of funding, according to 32 
respondents, comes from external assistance. For example KI-27 reports that FTCBOs get 
funds for CD from Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). Twelve respondents 
report that the government also sends funds into local communities via FTCBOs for CD. The 
16 second tier (STCBOs) comprise dance groups, cultural/religious groups like ‘Amonikpo’ 
secret cult groups, age grades and football clubs. Membership of STCBOs is based on 
individuals’ choice, by contrast to membership of FTCBOs which comes naturally to people, 
passed on through generations. 
 
Modern community-based organizations (MCBOs) 
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The total number of MCBOs was 101, divided into four types: 53 environmental MCBOs; 43 
charity MCBOs; three town MCBOs; and two resident MCBOs. It may seem that MCBOs 
are more like NGOs than CBOs in that they work across several communities and have their 
offices outside their catchment communities. Fifty four leaders of MCBOs, when asked what 
makes their organizations CBOs, say they work with local people (which suggests NGOs), 
while 43 say they work for local people (which suggests CBOs). We have classified them as 
CBOs partly because they usually identified themselves that way, and partly because they 
have come under the control of their host communities: about 65% of SQs and 60 % of KIs 
affirm that external MCBOs are permitted to operate by the leaders of their TCBOs. Results 
showed that most environmental MCBOs are funded by Shell, enabling them to employ 
professionally qualified staff, as TI-6 notes: “our managers and directors are professionals in 
different fields…the top directors are professionals in various disciplines, followed by 
directorates, facilitators and then liaison officers”. Only 19 out of the 53 environmental 
CBOs interviewed in this study say they fund their organizations through donations from 
well-wishers. The relationship between the leadership of these MCBOs and their 
beneficiaries can be described as that of the provider and the receiver. For example, TI-7 
claims that “our executive directors take decisions about the need of the communities”, while 
KI-31 says that MCBOs decide by themselves what they think community members need. On 
charity MCBOs, although most have their offices outside their catchment communities, 
findings from this research revealed that some Christian charity religious organizations 
(CCROs) are resident in the communities studied. These 31 CCROs say they source their 
funding from within the host communities through church offerings, tithes and donations. An 
Apostolic cleric says “we don’t get money from the government” (TI-22). According to KIs, 
there is a proliferation of town and resident MCBOs across Ogoni-land because there is an 
inflow of non-Ogoni indigenes into Ogoniland: “we have many Igbos, Yorubas and 
Akwaibom people that have their own organizations [town MCBOs]”. KI-28 explains that 
‘foreigners’ set up resident organizations as self-help organizations to take care of their 
needs.  
The criteria of community development (CD) 
 
When respondents were asked for their perceptions of community development (CD), two 
discourses of CD emerged: CD as infrastructural capital; and CD as human, economic, and 
social capital.  
 
Community development as infrastructural capital 
 
About 40% of TIs, all of whom are founders or executive members of MCBOs; 75% of SQs, 
who are mostly current and past leaders of TCBOs; and 10% of KIs, believe that CD means 
infrastructural capital. For example, KI-17 asserts that CD “is the development of community 
not individuals in the community, we got a transformer, it was for the development of the 
community…now we have a transformer anytime there is power supply we [the community] 
enjoy it, that is development”. Similarly, KI-18 holds that CD is purely about supplying 
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infrastructure to the community, and not about individual development. KI-10 states that CD 
is about “everything, roads, schools…our organizations cannot help individuals”.  
 
Community development as human, economic, and social capital 
 
The perception that CD is mainly about increasing human, economic, and social capital was 
held by about 20% of TIs; 30% of SQs; 70% of KIs; and three FGDs. This perception reflects 
an assumption that human, economic, and social development is prior to infrastructural 
development. For example, KI-1 asserts that “if the human aspect is taken care of, individuals 
can then build the community”. Twenty-seven KI respondents believe that human capital is 
enhanced through inclusive participatory processes in community decision-making that gives 
voice to community members. For example, KI-65 describes CD as entailing collective 
participation because it is “something one person cannot do, we need to put our heads 
together so that our community can be developed”. KI-29 points out that genuine CD ensures 
that the views of the least community member count, because “participation is not only by 
who is giving but also who is receiving”. FG-1 claims that “empowering people that make up 
the community, intellectually, academically, is the most important because it is the key to 
development”.  
 
Evaluation of the role of TCBOs and MCBOs in promoting CD 
 
TCBOs’ performance  
 
First, do TCBOs increase infrastructural capital? Beginning with first tier TCBOs, 25 
community leaders and elites report that their various FTCBOs do invest in the community 
by providing infrastructure. For example, KI- 17 explains that his organization through 
communal efforts provided a transformer in their community; KI-6 says his community youth 
organization built a town hall; and SQ-114 reports that FTCBOs in his community worked 
together to add three blocks of classroom to their community secondary school. However, 
criticism of FTCBOs’ attempts to provide infrastructural capital was common. The above 
claims that FTCBOs were agents of CD were refuted by about 70% of KIs; 25% of SQs and 3 
FGDs. Allegations of fraud are frequent. For example: 
 
SQ-7: “our chiefs always demand for money from contractors…see all the 
uncompleted projects around”. 
FG-2: FTCBO leaders “embezzle money meant for CD…our leaders collect money 
from the government and Shell and nothing gets to us…community leaders could 
bring in ten electricity poles and claim they brought in 100 pieces and you cannot 
confront them” 
KI-21: “my chief got money to do 3 boreholes…he only did one in his compound” 
 
About 50% of KIs, 30% of SQs, and 3 FGDs allege that their leaders feast on community 
funds, though these allegations were contested by about 60% of SQs and 10% of KIs. About 
60% of KIs say that the infrastructural capital is not designed to meet their felt needs but the 
prescriptions of their leaders. For example KI-6, a community leader, claims his FTCBO 
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(youth organization) built a town hall; but KI-25 says “what they [community leaders] do is 
always town halls, sign posts. Am not saying that they are not good, but our problems are 
more than these petty projects”. SQ-95 says: “our leaders do not take us [poor] into 
consideration in all they do”. Part of the problem is lack of funds: 22 SQs linked the inability 
of their FTCBOs/community to provide major infrastructure improvement to shortage of 
money. SQs-66 claims that “we always want to do more but lack finance”. Another part of 
the problem is disagreement over projects. KI-4 explains that misunderstanding between his 
community leaders/elites and members caused the destruction of the “few projects that some 
of our organizations [FTCBOs] were able to do, it was a serious crisis…see what everywhere 
looks like”. KI-21 notes that disagreement between a faction of youths and the leadership of 
his community resulted in “over 50% of our houses were burnt; this crisis lasted for close to 
8 years”.  
 
Second, do FTCBOs provide human, economic and social capital? There are two opposing 
perceptions on this issue from respondents. On the one hand, about 60% of SQs and 10% of 
KIs, who are mostly community leaders, claim that membership of FTCBOs is a source of 
both community participation and identity. For instance:  
 
KI-27: “they provide a platform for people to participate in community development”. 
KI-5: “every member has equal rights, the poor participate actively but they don’t 
contribute financially…the poor and the rich can speak their minds”. 
KI-29: they give me a sense of belonging…for example they want to know what am 
doing, it is interesting and I feel they love and care for me”. 
 
On the other hand, about 60% of KIs, 10% of SQs, and 3 FGDs refute these claims, arguing 
that their respective FTCBOs are discriminatory and do not provide for community 
participation. For example,  
 
KI-39: “our leader will not look your way if you are not influential, in our 
organization they only concentrate on the rich and people that are educated; they 
help themselves not people like me” 
KI-55: if you are a poor member, “even when you raise up your hand in the meeting 
nobody will call you, they will pretend as if they did not see it and even when you get 
the opportunity to talk, it is treated like a poor man’s talk…senseless talk…nobody 
regards me, they don’t regard me as part of them”. 
KI-59: “my organizations don’t need me because am not complete…they don’t have 
need for poor people like me”. 
 
Turning to second tier traditional community-based organizations (STCBOs), do they deliver 
infrastructure capital? Although few STCBOs are designed to provide infrastructure, one 
does – Amonikpo. The much celebrated achievement of this organization is the building of 
schools. KI-8 said the first primary school in his community was built by Amonikpo STCBO. 
On whether STCBOs contribute to human, social and economic capital, they are credited 
with significant impacts, both good and bad. Good impacts include the contributions made by 
football clubs. According to six KI and SQ respondents, football clubs are the most valuable 
agent of community development because they unite rather than divide community members. 
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SQ-69 says that “our football tournaments bring people together, everybody is involved”. 
Good impacts are also claimed for dance groups: four STCBO leaders insist their dance 
organizations contribute to CD because they preserve Ogoniland’s endangered culture. For 
example, SQ-21 claims “our aim is to educate our children on our culture and develop 
cultural dance”. However, some STCBOs are perceived to have negative impacts. For 
instance, cultural religious organizations, according to nine KI and SQ respondents, are not 
agents of CD. KI-65 explains that the Amonikpo cultural religious group/secret society is a 
human rights violator that brings division among his community members: “that organization 
is a big problem…if you are not their member; you are not allowed to go out when they have 
their festival in April. You will remain indoors until after their festival, is this agent of 
development?” KI-14 claims that the majority of Ogonis do not identify with Amonikpo or 
other secret religious organizations because “we try to advance only good culture and values, 
we do away with bad ones”. Respondents SQs- 43, 67, 101, and 155 and KIs-22, and 67 say 
that STCBOs do not contribute to the economic empowerment of community members 
because whatever money they get from cultural dances and festivals does not go into the 
community purse, but instead is used only by their own members. 
 
Although, there are some positive evaluations of TCBOs, the many criticisms directed against 
both first tier and second tier TCBOs for their failure to fulfil the criteria for CD in 
Ogoniland, explains why Ogonis look to non-traditional or modern CBOs. For instance, KI-
19 says “we call for help from outside organizations…we have so many problems and no 
solutions”. The next section looks at whether modern community-based organizations 
(MCBOs) fulfil the perceived criteria for CD. 
 
MCBOs’ performance  
Do MCBOs increase infrastructural capital? About 20% of KIs say that some charity MCBOs 
have contributed to the provision of infrastructure in their communities. KI-10 reports that 
they benefitted from six blocks of classrooms; KI-15 says they dug a borehole in his 
community which provides his community with potable drinking water; and KI-11 explains 
that charity MCBOs laid the foundation for a health centre in his community. Likewise, 
residential (or neighbourhood) MCBOs, according to TI-10, use members’ money for the 
development of their neighbourhood: “we develop our area of residence, there is need to 
control flooding”. On town MCBOs, positive evaluations come from KI-3: “They sometimes 
contribute to the development of our community because we approach them for money in the 
way of fines for community development”. 
 
However, nine KI and SQ respondents assert that when charity MCBOs are involved in the 
provision of infrastructure, they seldom engage genuinely with community residents but only 
with community leaders. Some charity MCBOs themselves admit this: for example, TI-23, a 
charity group leader, explains that “we cannot possibly engage with everybody but at least we 
try to do that through different leaders of their community organization”. This means that 
infrastructural development obtained from charity MCBOs may not represent the genuine 
needs of local communities, but instead the priorities set by community elites. For example, 
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KI-30 says that MCBOs are “hired contractors” because “they are only after themselves, 
most Shell officials own those organizations, they award contracts to them and make serious 
money”. Four KI respondents say that resident MCBOs are primarily organizations set up to 
serve the interests of their own members. Twelve residents note that both resident and town 
MCBOs are primarily concerned with the infrastructural interests of their members, and only 
contribute occasionally to their host Ogoni communities.  
 
On human, economic, and social capital, positive evaluations of charity MCBOs include 
statements by 13 out of 53 current community leaders that charity MCBOs work well in their 
communities. For example:  
 
KI-5: “some people came here and treated our people for different sicknesses at 
subsidized rate, they did quite a number of eye tests…Seeing our poverty level here, 
they decided to do for three thousand naira operations that cost like ten thousand 
naira at the general hospital”.  
KI-2: “they put in resources to help our people, they have skill acquisition 
programmes, most of our women here have learnt how to do a lot of things like 
bakery…with paltry sum of money”.  
 
However, charity organisations are criticised for being essentially market-driven, or even 
fraudulent, organizations. For instance, KI-18 says a charity MCBO duped the community: 
“they came here and I told them what they can do for us and that was to help in any way to 
bring up the educational level of our children. This organization now asked our people to pay 
four hundred naira each for passports, nothing came out of this… most of these organizations 
are fraudsters”. Another criticism of MCBOs, made by 55% of KIs, 65% of SQs, and 2 
FGDs, is remoteness: they are accused by respondents of failing to engage with them. For KI-
14, “they [MCBOs] don’t have any local knowledge of our community”. Criticism of resident 
MCBOs focuses on the selectiveness of their benefits. For instance, KI-28 explains that 
foreigners establish resident MCBOs as self-help organizations that will take care of their 
own economic and social needs, not the needs of the wider community. 
 
So although some positive evaluations are made of MCBOs, especially for their 
infrastructural and charitable contributions, they are heavily criticised for their market 
orientation, fraud, remoteness and self-servingness. 
 
 Discussion 
 
From the above account of our fieldwork, two opposed sets of perceptions have emerged 
about the relationship between CBOs and CD in eight Ogoni communities:  
 
 Many respondents perceive that their CBOs bring benefits to their communities 
 Many respondents are highly critical of the shortcomings of their CBOs in delivering 
CD to their communities  
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How can these apparently contradictory sets of perceptions be reconciled? There are two 
possible explanations: 
 
(1) The positive perceptions are about FTCBOs, whereas the negative perceptions are about 
MCBOs. There is some truth in this explanation, in that 23 of the 31 community leaders 
(SQs) who described their FTCBOs as natural agents of CD argue that they are irreplaceable. 
For example, SQ-18 says that “if you remove our organizations [FTCBOs], our village will 
die. Outside organizations [MCBOs] can only partner with us, they cannot take over our 
organizations”. However, this explanation ignores the many negative perceptions of 
FTCBOs, and the several positive perceptions of MCBOs, expressed by respondents. Thirty-
three KIs, 26 SQs and three FGDs, think their communities will survive without FTCBOs, 
while 21 KI and SQ respondents see potential in MCBOs.  
(2) The positive perceptions come mostly from respondents who are leaders of 
TCBOs/MCBOs, whereas the negative perceptions come mostly from respondents who are 
not leaders of TCBOs/MCBOs. It is true that leaders of CBOs tend to be more favourably 
disposed towards their CBOs than do non-leaders: 113 TCBO leaders (past and present) and 
101 MCBOs leaders stated that their organizations provide CD. However, this is not the 
whole story, because there are some leaders who are highly critical of their TCBOs, and there 
are some non-leaders who are very enthusiastic about some of their CBOs.   
 
The fact is that there are perceptions of good and bad CBOs in every category of CBOs and 
amongst all categories of respondent. However, we can discern a tendency among 
respondents to perceive that TCBOs favour traditional elites over the population as a whole, 
and we can draw the lesson that respondents wish to curb this tendency by introducing 
greater transparency and wider participation into FTCBO decision-making. Another 
discernible pattern is that respondents perceive that MCBOs tend to favour the sectional 
interests of their members over the public interest of their communities, and the lesson can be 
drawn that respondents favour the application of auditing processes to MCBOs to make them 
more accountable for their decisions. 
Conclusion and recommendations for further study 
 
In conclusion, although we found evidence that some respondents in Ogoni communities 
valued the contributions made by their community-based organisations (CBOs) to community 
development (CD), two critical findings emerged from this research. First, the fashionable 
belief that CBOs are strong agents of bottom-up CD is not borne out by this study of eight 
Ogoni communities, because neither their TCBOs nor their MCBOs are solely devoted to this 
task. On the contrary, there is evidence that at least some of these CBOs benefit from the 
continued underdevelopment of their local communities. Second, there is little difference 
between respondents’ evaluations of the contributions to CD made by MCBOs and the much-
vaunted communitarian TCBOs, which, unlike MCBOs, have the advantage of being internal. 
This is because both types of CBOs are inegalitarian in their structures and practise 
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prescribed (and even corrupt) forms of CD with limited community engagement or 
endorsement.   
 
The paper recommends further study into the nature of Ogoni communities for two reasons. 
First, it would be very helpful to investigate what is required of CBOs in Ogoni communities 
to ensure that they provide CD as felt needs rather than as prescribed needs. Part of such 
research could involve investigating the middle ground between these two conceptions of 
needs, and establishing how far educational processes might transform some prescribed needs 
into felt needs1. Second, although this research did not discover any significant difference in 
perceptions held by respondents in five oil-rich and three oil-poor Ogoni communities about 
the role of CBOs in delivering CD, this is an unexpected finding, and a comparable study of 
communities outside the oil-producing states in Nigeria could be used to test whether it is a 
reliable conclusion.  
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